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the difficulty, even if it is assumed that the Court is committed to one
rule. The "place of performance" rule offers an even more attenuated
"connection with the substance of the contract obligations" in view of
the Court's summary dismissal of the proposition that payment-the
usual performance of insurance contracts-was to take place in Missis-
sippi. And, while courts have sometimes respected the manifested in-
tention of the parties as to what law should govern their contract, any
statutory enactment requiring them to stipulate that the laws of the
jurisdiction in which the insured interest was located should govern
would undoubtedly come within the prohibitions of Allgeyer v.
Louiskm. 15
D. W. MARXHAM,
Constitutional Law-Interstate Transportation of
Intoxicating Liquors.
A recent Georgia case involving the confiscation of an interstate
shipment of beer emphasizes the renewed importance of the problem of
interstate liquor traffic.1 It 'was early established that a state in the
exercise of its police power could close saloons and prohibit the man-
ufacture and sale of intoxicating liquors,2 but a state could not prohibit
carriers from bringing liquors into the state without interfering with
interstate commerce.3  Thereupon the open saloons gave way to the
shops of local agents which, under the protection of the Commerce
Clause, were able to operate without state interference so long as sales
were made in the original package.4 Congress then passed the Wilson
Act,5 which the prohibitionists thought would put an end to the seem-
ing evasions of the state laws. This act was held valid,0 but it was
interpreted quite literally, in Rhodes v. Iowa,7 to mean that the state
laws could take effect upon liquor shipped into the state only after ar-
rival and delivery to the consignee. Thus while the consignee might
be prohibited from selling it, he was free to have it shipped in for his
165 U. S. 580, 17 Sup. Ct. 427, 41 L. ed. 832 (1897), cited note 6, supra.
A statute so worded as to clearly indicate that it was an assertion of the
state's power over persons and property within its borders might present a
stronger case for validity. However, the localization of an insurable interest
within a certain state does not, logically, require the localization of contracts
concerning that interest within the same state.
IRyman v. Legg, 176 S. E. 403 (Ga. 1934).
2Mugler v. Kansas, 123 U. S. 623, 8 Sup. Ct. 273, 31 L. ed. 205 (1887).
'Bowman v. Chicago & N. W. Ry., 125 U. S. 465, 8 Sup. Ct. 689, 31 L. ed.
700 (1888).
'Leisy v. Hardin, 135 U. S. 100, 10 Sup. Ct. 681, 34 L. ed. 128 (1890).
026 STAT. 313 (1890), 27 U. S. C. A. §121 (1934 Supp.).
'In re Rahrer, 140 U. S. 545, 11 Sup. Ct. 865, 35 L. ed. 572 (1891).
'170 U. S. 412, 18 Sup. Ct. 664, 42 L. ed. 1088 (1898).
NOTES AND COMMENTS
personal consumption. This condition existed until 1913 when Con-
gress passed the Webb-Kenyon Act,8 which divested intoxicating
liquors of their interstate character and thereby enabled and permitted
the dry state of destination to exercise control the moment the ship-
ment crossed its borders. In spite of the word "prohibited" this act
contained no penal provision and its violation was not a federal offense.9
Four years later Congress took a rather drastic step in adopting the
Reed Amendment,1 0 which made it a federal offense to advertise liquors
in dry states and "to order, purchase, or cause" intoxicating liquors
(except for scientific, etc., purposes) to be transported in interstate
commerce into a state the laws of which prohibit their manufacture or
sale for beverage purposes. In 1919, upon the ratification of the Eight-
eenth Amendment,11 the "manufacture, sale, or transportation" of in-
toxicating liquors designed for beverage purposes was forbidden, and
Congress and the several states were given concurrent power to en-
force national prohibition by appropriate means. The federal Beer
Act' 2 enacted in March, 1933, removed the prohibition of the Volstead
Act as to 3.2 per centum beer, wines, etc., and incorporated sections
similar to the Webb-Kenyon Act13 and the Reed Amendment 14 to
prevent the shipment of same into states the laws of which forbid the
manufacture or sale of such beverages. In the absence of these sec-
tions, light wines and beers could probably have -been shipped into the
bone-dry states under protection of the Commerce Clause upon the
theory they were not intoxicating liquors. The last major event was
the ratification in December, 1933, of the Twenty-first Amendment, 15
which (1) repealed the Eighteenth Amendment and the Volstead Act,'1
and (2) prohibited the "transportation, or importation into any State,
Territory, or Possession of the United States for use or deliyery therein
of intoxicating liquors in violation of the laws thereof."
The scope of the Wilson and Webb-Kenyon Acts was held not to be
limited by the National Prohibition Act or the Eighteenth Amend-
ment.17 Since these acts are not inconsistent with the Twenty-first
837 STAT. 699 (1913), 27 U. S. C. A. §122 (1934 Supp.). Held constitutional,
James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry., 242 U. S. 311, 37 Sup. Ct.
180, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917).0 Dowling and Hubbard, Divesting at Article of its Interstate Character
(1920), 5 MiNm. L. REv. 100, 253.
20 39 STAT. 1069 (1917), 18 U. S. C. A. §341, 27 U. S. C. A. §123 (1933 Supp.).
nU. S. CONsT.
148 STA. 17 (1933), 27 U. S. C. A. §64 a-p (1934 Supp.).
=48 STAT. 19, 27 U. S. C. A. §64i (1933).
1448 STAT. 19, 27 U. S. C. A. §64k (1933).
"U. S. CoNsT.
"'United States v. Chambers, 54 Sup. Ct. 434 (U. S. 1934).
2M cCormick & Co., Inc. v. Brown, 286 U. S. 582, 52 Sup. Ct. 522, 76 L.
ed. 1017 (1932).
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Amendment, it is assumed they are now in force to the same extent.
The Reed Amendment was so revised in 1934 as to eliminate the pro-
hibition of advertising intoxicating liquors in dry states by means of
the mails.' 8 The federal restrictions apply to those states in which
prohibition extends over the entire territory, not merely to parts under
local option;19 but in one instance they were invoked to prohibit the
interstate shipment into a single dry county in Texas upon the theory
that the local unit was dry by state law although the rest of the state
remained wet.2 0
The word "commerce" as used in the constitutional sense "is a term
of the largest import" 2 ' and is not restricted to a commercial or busi-
ness transaction; in fact a person walking across an interstate bridge
is engaged in interstate commerce. 22 Therefore the federal control
over the transportation or importation in interstate commerce of intox-
icating liquors for beverage purposes "into" dry states is not limited to
common carriers ;23 it extends to prohibit the transportation by a per-
son who carries the same from one state into another in his own private
vehicle, not for the purposes of trade, but for his own personal use.24
The intention as to ultimate destination of the goods fixes the character
of transportation, whether intrastate, interstate, or foreign.28 It is
generally held that there is no offense until the liquor has been trans-
ported "into" the dry state.26 The repeal of the Eighteenth Amend-
ment removed the restriction upon the shipments "through" dry states
as a mere incident of the transportation to another state. Under the
protection of the Commerce Clause intoxicating liquors may be shipped
"through" dry states,2 7 and may be carried by persons on a train pass-
148 S'AT. 316, 27 U. S. C. A. §123 (1934 Supp.).
" Laughter v. U. S., 259 Fed. 94 (C. C. A. 6th, 1919) ; United States v. Collins,
263 Fed. 657 (C. C4 A. 5th, 1919) ; West Jersey & S. Ry. v. City of Millville,
91 N. J. Law 572, 103 Adt. 245 (1918).
' McAdams v. Wells Fargo & Co. Express, 249 Fed. 175 (E. D. La. 1918).
'Welton v. State of Mo., 91 U. S. 275, 280, 23 L. ed. 347, 350 (1875).
'
1Covington &c. Bridge Co. v. Kentucky, 154 U. S. 204, 14 Sup. Ct. 1087,
38 L. ed. 962 (1894).
'James Clark Distilling Co. v. Western Maryland Ry. Co., 242 U. S. 311, 37
Sup. Ct. 180, 61 L. ed. 326 (1917).
United States v. Simpson, 252 U. S. 465, 40 Sup. Ct. 364, 64 L. ed. 665 (1919).
'United States v. Picou, 71 F. (2d) 854 (C. C. A. 5th, 1934).
- United States v. Collins, 263 Fed. 657 (C. C. A. 5th, 1919) ; Moran v. U. S.,
264 Fed. 768 (C. C. A. 6th, 1920). Contra: Ex Parte Westbrook, 250 Fed. 636
(S. D. Fla. 1918) (defendants attempted to carry liquor from wet Florida to
dry Georgia; conviction under Reed Amendment for causing intoxicating liquors
to be transported in interstate commerce although they had driven only 2 miles
in Florida).
' United States v. Gudger, 249 U. S. 373, 39 Sup. Ct. 323, 63 L. ed. 653(1919) ; Martin v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 715; 100 S. E. 836 (1919).
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ing through the state,28 or even in a truck or automobile29 in the ab-
sence of evidence to show that the parties intended to use or dispose of
same within the state. This right is not lost or impaired by the transfer
in the dry state of some portion of the liquor to another vehicle pro-
vided it is intended in good faith that the whole of it shall be carried
directly into another state, the intent and good faith being a question
for the jury.30 To prevent the abuse of importation under the claim
of a "through" shipment, the courts of the states through which the
shipments pass may determine upon the evidence in the individual case
whether the transportation is bona fide "through" the state.3 ' If a
"through" shipment remains in a dry state an undue length of time for
a reason not incidental to the shipping conditions accompanying the
transportation, it loses the protection of interstate commerce and becomes
subject to local laws.3 2 The Supreme Court of Tennessee has held that
if it is unlawful to sell intoxicating liquors in the state of destination,
then the liquor is not a legitimate article of interstate commerce and is
therefore amenable to the laws of the state to which it is brought or
through which it passes.3 3 If this case is followed, North Carolina may
prosecute one who transports liquor through the state from wet Virginia
to presently dry South Carolina.
The Reed Amendment as construed in United States v. Hill 4 goes
beyond the previous federal acts, which were designed to aid the states
in enforcing their own laws. If a state permits importation or receipt of
liquor for personal use or otherwise, but prohibits the manufacture or
sale, the Reed Amendment makes it a federal offense to import any liquor
for any purposes save those condoned by the amendment: scientific,
I United States v. Gudger, 249 U. S. 373, 39 Sup. Ct. 323, 63 L. ed. 653
(1919) ; Martin v. Commonwealth, 126 Va. 715, 100 S. E. 836 (1919).
'Durst v. U. S., 266 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920) ; Moragne v. State, 201
Ala. 388, 78 So. 450 (1918).
o Durst v. U. S. 266 Fed. 65 (C. C. A. 4th, 1920).
"Theatrical Club v. State, 199 Ala. 562, 74 So. 696 (1917); Moragne v.
State, 20i Ala. 388, 78 So. 450 (1918) ; Marler v. Vandiviere, 178 Ga. 115, 172
S. E. 33 (1933).
1 Theatrical Club v. State, 199 Ala. 562, 74 So. 969 (1917).
' Haumschilt v. State, 142 Tenn. 520, 221 S. W. 196 (1920).
248 U. S. 420, 39 Sup. Ct. 143, 63 L. ed. 337 (1919) (Defendant bought whis-
ky, intending to take it to W. Va. for his personal use as a beverage, and for that
purpose carried it on his person on a trip by common carrier into the latter state,
the laws of which specifically permitted such importation but forbade manufacture
or sale for beverage purposes; defendant was convicted for violating the Reed
Amendment irrespective of the state law). (McReynolds, J., dissented as follows:
"The Reed Amendment as now construed is a congressional fiat imposing more
complete prohibition wherever the state has assumed to prevent manufacture
or sale... If Congress may deny liquor to those who live in a state simply because
its manufacture is prohibited there, why may not this be done for any suggested
reason-e. g. because the roads are bad, or men are hanged for murder, or coals
are dug? Where is the limit?")
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medicinal, etc. Thus the state law is superseded. Upon a further
strict construction of this act,35 it might be held that if North Carolina,
for instance, should so modify its prohibition laws as to permit the
importation and sale of beverages which might qualify in law as in-
toxicating liquors (e.g., beer of greater than 3.2 per centum alcohol),
the importation of same would be prohibited by the Reed Amendment
unless the manufacture as well as sale thereof were made lawful. It
is noteworthy that the Twenty-first Amendment in contrast merely
prohibits the transportation or importation into the state for use or
delivery therein of intoxicating liquors "in violation of the laws there-
of." Since there is now a strong constitutional guarantee of protection
against the transportation into dry states contrary to the laws of those
states, the Reed Amendment might well be repealed. In the event of such
repeal, the dry states would again be able to have a modified form of
prohibition (e.g., permitting the bringing in, and possession of, small
quantities for personal use) without subjecting their citizens to pun-
ishment for a federal offense contrary to the spirit of the Twenty-first
Amendment.
THOMAs H. LEATH.
Constitutional Law-Validity of Municipal Ordinance Excluding
Personal Sureties in Requirement of Bond for Operation
of Taxicabs.
As a condition precedent to the operation of public service auto-
mobiles on the streets of Charlotte, North Carolina, an ordinance re-
quired the deposit with the treasurer of the city of either liability
insurance with a responsible company authorized to do business in the
state, or cash or securities in lieu thereof.' In a recent case the jury
found that the defendant had met all state and municipal requirements
for the operation of taxicabs, except compliance with the ordinance.!
The trial court's verdict of not guilty of any offense was affirmed by
the supreme court on the ground that since the ordinance made no pro-
vision for bonds with personal sureties, it was unconstitutional, in that
' United States v. Collins, 254 Fed. 869 (W. D. La. 1919).
'An ordinance to regulate the operation of cabs, taxicabs, and for-hire cars,
adopted by the city of Charlotte, October 27, 1933 :-"Section one: No. person,
firm, or corporation shall operate. . . cabs, taxicabs, or for-hire cars.. . upon the
streets of Charlotte... unless (A) said operators shall have filed with the treas-
urer of the city of Charlotte... policies of liability insurance with a responsible
company authorized to do business in North Carolina, indemnifying licensees...(in stated sums)... in any action wherein said driver may be held liable. (B)
In lieu, of such insurance, . . .operators may- deposit like amounts... in cash or
securities.' Section two prescribes penalties.
2State v. Sasseen, 206 N. C. 644, 175 S. E. 142 (1934).
